NOTES
THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMES OF AGE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSE TO
THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT*
"International law is the law which the wicked do not obey and
which the righteous do not enforce."
- Abba Eban.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait offered the United Nations Security
Council an opportunity to prove to the community of nations that,
as an organization charged with the maintenance of international
peace and security, it was up to the job. Throughout the latter half
of 1990, world attention focused on the banks of the East River, in
addition to the Persian Gulf, as the Security Council rose to the
occasion and systematically applied the authority granted by the
Charter of the United Nations. In a series of twelve resolutions
concerning the invasion-commencing with an initial order for withdrawal, continuing with comprehensive sanctions, and concluding with
a historic resolution approving the use of military force-the Council
demonstrated an ability to confront aggression in both word and
deed.
Considering these extraordinary events, it now seems that early
reports of the United Nations' demise were perhaps premature, if
not exaggerated.' The decisive diplomacy that emerged as the Security
* The author would like to thank Professor Louis B. Sohn for helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this note and Gail K. Ripans for countless consultations
throughout its preparation. In addition, classmates R. Brandon Asbill, Daniel M.
LeBey, and Tara M. Rice provided invaluable advice. Also appreciated, for their
time and skill in proofreading are Victoria A. Hughes, Christopher K. Nelder, Edwin
J. Sabec, and Carol A. Watson. Finally, the author is grateful for the dependable
efforts of C.M. Stirling McIlwaine III in securing some of the more elusive sources.
** Former Israeli ambassador to the United States. Statement to Edward R.
Murrow on Person to Person (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 20, 1957) quoted in
G. voN GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAw 3-4 (3d ed. 1976).
See, e.g., B. BECKER, IS TiM UNITED NATIONS DEAD? (1969) and S. HAZZARD,
DEFEAT OF AN IDEAL: A STUDY OF THE SELF-DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(1973).
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Council addressed the events in the Persian Gulf was the latest
evidence that the forty-five-year-old organization was determined to
fulfill its intended role. 2 While room may remain to discuss the wisdom
of the Security Council's decisions concerning the invasion and annexation of Kuwait, of the Council's right to make those decisions,
there should be no doubt.

II.
A.

THE INVASION OF KUWAIT

Breach of the Peace

In the early morning of 2 August 1990, an estimated 120,000 Iraqi
troops crossed the border into the neighboring sheikdom of Kuwait.'
Within hours, the invading forces had seized the nation's abundant
oil fields, occupied the capital city,4 and driven the ruler into exile.'
2 In recent years the United Nations has been credited with overseeing the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Cuban troops from Angola, and
South African troops from Namibia. In addition, the Organization was responsible
for negotiating a cease-fire in the decade-old Iran-Iraq War, monitoring free elections
in Nicaragua, disarming the Nicaraguan Contras, and supervising negotiations between the government and Marxist rebels in El Salvador. Moreover, in what would
have seemed to be an overly optimistic undertaking a few years ago, plans are
underway for United Nations involvement to resolve the conflicts in the Western
Sahara, Ethiopia, Haiti, Guatemala, the two Koreas, and Cambodia. Krondacke,
Javier of the U.N.: the Quietly Great Secretary-General, NEw REPULUc, Aug. 13,
1990, at 20.
3 Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y. Times, Aug.
2, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6.
4 Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, § A, at
1, col. 6. The invaders, led by more than 350 main battle tanks and supported by
weapons supplied in large measure by the Soviet Union, France, and the People's
Republic of China, quickly overwhelmed the Kuwaiti forces. Id.

An examination of the comparative strength of the two nations at the time of
the invasion demonstrates the disproportionate advantage of Iraq:
Men Under Arms
Tanks
Towed Artillery
Support Artillery
Combat Aircraft
Armed Helicopters
Naval Vessels

KuwmT
20,300
275
60
36
36
18
8

IRAQ
1,000,000
5,500
3,000
500
513
160
38

Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: Situation in Brief, Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1990, at A27.
Iraqi Invasion Forces Seize Control of Kuwait, Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1990, at
Al. The Emir of Kuwait, Sheik Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, left the country for Saudi
Arabia shortly after Iraqi forces crossed the border. Id.
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The invasion marked the culmination of two weeks of rapidly deteriorating relations between the two Persian Gulf states. 6 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein 7 initially proffered a justification for the invasion
that feigned legal merit," but ultimately announced the annexation
of Kuwait. 9
The global reaction to Iraq's impudent disregard of international
law was one of outrage; condemnations were exceptionally swift and

See Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, § A, at 9, col.
1. On July 17, 1990, Iraq alleged that Kuwait, along with the United Arab Emirates,
was flooding the world oil market by exceeding oil-production quotas, thereby
adversely affecting prices. Later, Iraq increased the tensions in the region by accusing
Kuwait of stealing $2.4 billion worth oil from fields along a disputed border between
the two nations as well as intentionally seeking to destroy the Iraqi economy by
refusing to forgive $10 billion in interest free loans made during the Iran-Iraq War.
By July 25, 1990, Iraq had called the Kuwaiti foreign minister an American agent,
accused the Kuwaiti rulers of taking part in a Zionist plot against Iraq, and threatened
Kuwait with invasion. Iraq and Kuwait: The Joys of Brotherhood, ECONOMST, July
28, 1990, at 33 (U.K. ed. at 59). Two days before the invasion, Iraq agreed to send
a delegation to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, to negotiate the dispute with Kuwait. Simultaneously, Iraq massed tanks and troops on Kuwait's border. After one session,
the talks broke down and hostilities became imminent. Iraqi Invasion, Step by Step,
supra at 9.
7 President Saddam Hussein of Iraq is known throughout the Arab world by
his first name, which means "One Who Confronts." He is never referred to in the
Arab press as President Hussein, but rather President Saddam. "One Who Confronts," N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1990, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
I IraqiArmy Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, supra note 3. Saddam
maintained that the Kuwaiti government had been overthrown and that the invasion
was in response to a request from the interim government of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti
Embassy in Washington, however, denied that Kuwait's existing government had
been replaced. Id.
9 Excerpts from Iraq's Statement on Kuwait, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1990, § A,
at 18, col. 1. The communiqu6 announced that Iraq had "decided to return the
part and branch, Kuwait, to the whole and origin, Iraq, in a comprehensive, eternal
and inseparable merger unity." Id. President Saddam claimed that "history has
proved that Kuwait is part of Iraq." Press Statement of President Saddam Hussein
in Baghdad, Iraq (Aug. 8, 1990) (excerpts available from Federal News Service,
LEXIS, NEXIS library, Fednew file).
The Iraqi claim to Kuwait was first made in 1932 when Iraq called for Kuwait's
annexation based upon the fact that both nations had been part of the Ottoman
Empire, the legacy to which Baghdad lays claim. Gaier, Hussein and the Arabs: A
Quest for Identity, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 17, 1990, at 19. Iraq's proprietary
interest was apparent when Britain granted independence to Kuwait in June 1961;
Baghdad welcomed its new neighbor by claiming the territory for Iraq. Britain
dispatched a expeditionary force in defense of the nation that had been its responsibility under the post World War I mandatory system. A confrontation was avoided
when the Arab League recognized Kuwait a month later. By 1963, Iraq also acknowledged Kuwait's right to exist. Experts Snub "History" Claim, Newsday, Aug.
9, 1990, News §, at 12 (city ed. at 38).
6
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virtually unanimous. 10 In what would later be viewed as the foundation
for international cooperation during the crisis, the Soviet Union and
the United States issued an unprecedented joint statement" which
denounced the invasion, urged a worldwide boycott of arms shipments
2
to Iraq, and called for prompt action by the United Nations.'
B.

Interruption of Economic Relations
The United Nations Security Council,' 3 in a meeting called to order
10Goodbye Kuwait, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 1990, at 13 (U.K. ed. at 11). On the

day of the invasion, President George Bush issued an order which froze all Iraqi
assets in the United States and prohibited exports to and imports from Iraq. Executive
Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990). To protect the property of the
legitimate Government of Kuwait from seizure, the President blocked those assets
as well. Exec. Order No. 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,805 (1990); See also U.S., Three
Other Nations Take Steps to Freeze Assets of Kuwaitis, Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1990,
at A25.
In addition to an outcry from the United States and other Western Nations, Iraq
met with disapproving pronouncements from the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China, both longtime allies of and significant arms suppliers to Baghdad.
Jordan was the sole nation voicing support for the invasion. Id. Even historically
neutral Switzerland sided against Iraq. Switzerland Joining the World, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 11, 1990, at 48 (U.K. ed. at 42) For additional discussion of international
reaction to the invasion, see Trade Sanctions Against BaghdadImposed by European
Community, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 4. Arab Nations Break
Silence, Condemn Iraq, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1990, at A13; Arms Flow to Iraq
Halted by Soviets, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, § A, at 10, col. 6. West Europeans
Join U.S. in Condemning Invasion, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, § A, at 10, col. 2;
Israelis Condemn Baghdad's Strike, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, § A, at 10, col. 5.
1, U.S., Soviets Call for World Cutoff of Arms to Iraq, Wash. Post, Aug. 4,
1990, at A13. United States Secretary of State, James A. Baker III, underscoring
the unusual nature of the joint communiqu6, acknowledged that in the past both
superpowers would have likely viewed such "tragic action" through an "East-West
prism." Moscow Joins U.S. in CriticizingIraq, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1990, § 1, at
6, col. 1.
2 Moscow Joins U.S. in Criticizing Iraq, supra note 11. In their statement, the
two nations labeled the Iraqi action as running "counter to the fundamental principles
of the U.N. Charter and international law." They called on the United Nations
Security Council to "promptly and decisively condemn the brutal and illegal invasion
of Kuwait by Iraqi military forces." Joint Statement by Secretary of State Baker
and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union
(TASS), Aug. 3, 1990 (available on LEXIS, NEXIS library, TASS File).
'1 The United Nations Security Council is composed of fifteen members. Five
are permanent: China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
The ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly to serve twoyear terms. At the time of the crisis in the Gulf, the non-permanent members of
the Security Council were: Canada, Colombia, C6te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen, and Zaire. N.Z. MnIsTm oF ExOTNAI. RELATiONS
& TRADE, 1990 U.N. HANDBOOK 37-39 (1990).
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within hours of thd aggression, approved resolution 660 (1990), condemning the invasion and demanding the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 14 On 6 August 1990 the
Security Council, responding to Iraq's refusal to withdraw from
Kuwait," and invoking the sweeping authority granted by Chapter
V1116 of the Charter of the United Nations for the third time in
history, 7 approved resolution 661 (1990) which imposed economic
sanctions on Iraq. 8

14 S.C. Res. 660, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Security Council Resolution 660 was
adopted on 2 August 1990 by a vote of fourteen in favor and zero against. One
member, Yemen, did not participate in the vote, citing lack of instruction from its
government. The Iraqi Invasion: U.N. Condemns the Invasion with Threat to Punish
Iraq, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, § A, at 10, col. 1. The full text of the resolution
is contained in Appendix A.
IS See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16 Chapter VII is entitled: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches
of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
'7 Sanctions Against Iraq Mark Only the Third U.N. Imposed Embargo, Reuter
Lib. Rep., Aug. 6, 1990 (available on LEXIS, NEXIS library, Lbyrpt file). Earlier
uses of mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII occurred between 1966 and 1977
against the breakaway British colony of Southern Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe) and again in 1977 against South Africa. In both cases, the main aim of the
sanctions was to prevent certain items from reaching the targeted countries. In the
situation, however, the prime objective was to prevent Iraq and occupied Kuwait
from exporting oil, the commodity upon which both nations were financially dependent. Id.
A significant distinction from earlier sanctions can be drawn in the case of Iraq.
Prior to the imposition of sanctions, Iraq was a "state in good standing," while
prior U.N. sanctions were against the "outlaw states" of Southern Rhodesia and
South Africa. United Nations Testing New Role in Latest Crisis, The Boston Globe,
Aug. 16, 1990, National/Foreign §, at 2.
In further contrast to the previous impositions of sanctions, which were selective
and limited to enumerated goods, the sanctions against Iraq were absolute. For
background on the earlier use of sanctions by the Security Council, see Note, U.N.
Application of Selective, Mandatory Sanctions Against Rhodesia: A Brief Legal and
PoliticalAnalysis, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 147 (1967) (providing a detailed discussion of
the particulars of the Southern Rhodesian sanctions) and Comment, Sanctions and
South Africa, 19 HARv. INT'L L. J. 887 (1978) (providing an overview of the U.N.
sanctions imposed on South Africa).
Finally, on two occasions-the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the Iran-Iraq War
of 1980-the Security Council threatened sanctions against both sides of the conflicts
unless a cease fire was agreed to; in both cases, fighting ended before any trade
restrictions were imposed. The Iraqi Invasion: U.N. Expected to Approve Iraq and
Kuwait Trade Ban, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, § A, at 6, col. 1.
11S.C. Res. 661, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). For the text of the resolution, see
Appendix B.
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The sanctions prohibited member states of the United Nations from
buying oil from either Iraq or Kuwait, 19 and restricted all financial
and commercial dealings except those directly related to humanitarian
aid. The Security Council conditioned the duration of the sanctions
only upon the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and the restoration of
Kuwait's legitimate government. 20 The resolution, legally binding upon
all members of the United Nations, 2 1 passed by a vote of thirteen to
zero, with Cuba and Yemen abstaining. 22
Two days later, Iraq defied the Council's directive by announcing
it had formally annexed Kuwait. 23 The Council unanimously declared
this action null and void. 24 Resolution 664 (1990), the fourth passed
during the crisis, demanding that Iraq permit the departure of foreign
nationals from Iraq and Kuwait and condemning Iraq's order to close
2
diplomatic missions in Kuwait, 5 also passed without objection.2
The rapid response by the Security Counci 7 in addressing the
invasion of Kuwait immediately raised hopes the Security Council
was returning to the role intended by its founders. 28 In a textbook

19 Prior to the invasion, Iraq was heavily dependent on the export of oil. Recent
estimates ran as high as 99076 of all commodity exports. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FED.
RESEARCH Div., AREA HANDBOOK SERIES No. 550-31, IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY 142
(1990). Experts on Middle East oil issues agreed that the goal of increased revenues
from oil exports figured heavily into Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait. Overnight,
Iraq is OPEC's Most Important Member, Aug. 3, 1990, Wash. Post, at A27.
Security Council Votes 13 to 0 to Block Trade with Baghdad, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 7, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6.
1, See infra note 113 & note 114 and accompanying text. See generally J. CAsTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

(1969).

U.N. Security Council Votes Embargo on Iraq, Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1990, at
Al. The indecision on the part of Yemen, the only Arab member of the Security
Council and close ally of Iraq, revealed the disagreement among Arab states over
whether to confront or support Iraq. Id.
21 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
24 S.C. Res. 662, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). See also U.N. Council Declares Void
Iraqi Annexation of Kuwait, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1990, § A, at 11, col. 1. For

the text of the resolution, see Appendix C.
2S Kuwait: The Crisis, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Dec. 1991, at 4, 15.
2 S.C. Res. 664, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Resolution 664 (1990) concerned, inter
alia, the nationals of third countries in Iraq and Kuwait as well as diplomatic
missions in Kuwait. Adopted by unanimous vote of the Security Council at its 2937th
meeting on 18 August 1990. The United Nations: Security Council Resolutions
ConcerningIraqi Aggression, 29 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1323, 1323 n.* (1990) [hereinafter
Security Council Resolutions]. For the text of the resolution, see Appendix D.
27

The Security Council, in the meeting convened at 5:00 a.m., Eastern Daylight
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example of international cooperation,29 the Security Council quickly
coordinated a clear condemnation of the Iraqi onslaught into Kuwait."0
Conspicuously absent was the customary rivalry between the Soviet
Union and United States. At the time of Iraq's invasion, the two
superpowers were enjoying a post-Cold War comity, having overcome
forty-five years of mistrust which had derailed previous attempts by
the Security Council to check acts of aggression."'
Notwithstanding the unprecedented unity, the initial consensus was
ephemeral, quickly showing signs of dissension. Disagreement developed over the exact implications of the Security Council resolutions,
as well as the precise limitations upon a member of the United Nations
in enforcing the Chapter VII sanctions. 2
The dispute centered on two interpretations of the United Nations
Charter. The United States cited a request from the Emir of Kuwait,
the Security Council resolutions, and Article 51 of the Charter,3 3 as
providing the legal justification for a unilateral decision to enforce
sanctions by intercepting ships on the high seas suspected of violating
4
resolution 661 (1990).1

Time, took one hour to produce resolution 660 (1990), condemning the Iraqi invasion.
Goodbye Kuwait, supra note 10.
2
Action on Gulf Raises Hopes U.N. Will Return to Intended Path, Reuter,
Aug. 7, 1990 (available on LEXIS, NEXIS library, Reuter file) (quoting "one
prominent ambassador" as predicting, "[t]he U.N. now has a reasonable chance of
going back to what was originally planned for it, if the great powers agree.").
29 Jeffery Laurenti of the United Nations Association stated in an interview, "This
is the classic kind of aggression that the U.N. Charter was written to prevent: State
A attacks State B with no messy domestic complications. Now that we have an end
to the Stalin-era vision that paralyzed the Security Council, the entire world can be
marshalled against [the aggressor]." United Nations Testing New Role in Latest
Crisis, supra note 17, at 2.
" In stark contrast, when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the Security Council merely
called for a cease-fire, failing to demand the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. Security
Council Chance to Fulfill Intended Role, The Times (London), Aug. 6, 1990, Overseas
News §, at 2.
1 For example, in 1989 the United States vetoed an attempt to condemn its
invasion of Panama. A decade earlier, the Soviet Union cast its own veto when the
Security Council addressed the invasion of Afghanistan. Speedy Condemnation of
Invasion Shows New U.N. Strength, The Independent, Aug. 3, 1990, at 9.
32 Security Council's Rare Unity May Be Threatened Over U.S. Warships in the
Gulf, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1990, § 1, at 7, col. 2.
1 Article 51 provides for the inherent right of individual or collective self defense
while waiting for Security Council action. See infra note 195 and accompanying
text.
34 Transcript of U.S. Statement About Measures Against Iraq, N.Y. Times, Aug.
13, 1990, § A, at 11, col. 1. Secretary of State Baker explained:
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The other Council members held one of several differing positions,
all variations on the same theme: only the Security Council, through
additional and explicit resolutions, can authorize additional measures.35 Startled by the United States' announcement, they asserted
36
that an impatient Bush Administration was imposing a blockade,

Sec. Baker: The Government of Kuwait-the legitimate Government of
Kuwait-has just requested of us and of other nations support for enforcement of the U.N. economic sanctions. In other words, they've made
the formal request now that is needed under Article 51 of the United
Nations [C]harter for the United States and other Countries to have a legal
basis for stopping the... export of oil and that sort of thing.
This Week with David Brinkley: An Interview with Secretary of State James A.
Baker III (ABC Television Broadcast, Aug. 12, 1990) (transcript available from
Federal News Service, LEXIS, NEXIS library, Fednew file).
" Don't Lose the Consensus, Fin. Times, Aug. 15, 1990, § I, at 14. The SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cu~llar, warned the United States
against unilateral action: "Any intervention, whatever the country, would not be in
accordance with either the letter or the spirit of the United nations Charter." U.N.
Chief Argues Blockade is Hasty, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1990, § A, at 12, col. 1.
m The United States, however, denied a "blockade" was planned, insisting the
proper word was "interdiction." And Now the "B Word" (Do Not Say Blockade),
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, § A, at 8, col. 1. For examples of the double-speak
involved, compare This Week with David Brinkley: An Interview with Secretary of
State James A. Baker III, supra note 34 (Sec. Baker repeatedly avoids the term
"blockade", preferring the term "interdiction" instead.) with White House Briefing
from Marlin Fitzwater, (Office of the Press Secretary, Kennebunkport, ME, Aug.
17, 1990) (transcript available from the Federal News Service, LEXIS, NEXIS library,
Fednew file.). The relevant excerpt of the briefing reads as follows:
Mr. Fitzwater: We obviously believe that Article 51 authorizes our intercept
activities ....
Questioner: Why the word "intercept" instead of the word you had been
using, "interdict"?
Mr. Fitzwater: It just turns out that semantics is an interesting exercise for
the government as well as the press, and that the word they chose as being
the most descriptive of what we're actually doing, which is to say intercepting
ships, seeing what kind of cargo they have if they're not willing to turn
away, and if they violate the UN sanctions, then ask them to turn away.
Questioner: Is [intercept] a more military term or less military term than
interdict? (Laughter.) If somebody asked you, is it closer to the "B"
[blockade] word?
Mr. Fitzwater: I don't know.
Id.
A credible rationale for precision in the word choice is that the United States
desired to avoid the terminology of war; language with legal meaning in both the
international and the domestic arena. Internationally, a blockade would require the
establishment of special courts to change vessel and property titles. Domestically,
the word could be used by Members of Congress to force the President into
compliance with the War Powers Act of 1973. Why the Word Blockade Won't Pass
U.S. Lips, Boston Globe, Aug. 14, 1990, National §, at 3. Both the international
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creating a tenuous legal justification, and disregarding the systematic
7
procedure for such actions set forth in the Charter.1
Given that creatively expansive interpretations of the United Nations
Charter were not new for the United States,38 as well as its prior
history of broad applications of the inherent right of self-defense in
the Western Hemisphere,39 it was not surprising that the United States
was ready to move more quickly than others. 40 It was clear, however,
that such action by the United States risked alienating its allies, and
4
thereby the Security Council. '

and domestic implications of the legal meaning of blockade are beyond the scope
of this writing. For an analysis of the former, see Comment, The Case for Legitimate
Interdiction of Commerce During Peacetime, 10 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 191 (1987).
For an examination of the latter, see Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers
Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379 (1988).
17Putting Teeth in an Embargo: How the U.S. Convinced the U.N., N.Y. Times,
Aug. 30, 1990, § A, at 1, co. 4. The Canadian representative to the United Nations
cautioned the United States against unilateral action, noting "there are no precedents,
so why not play it as the framers of the Charter had envisioned it." Id.
38 At times the United States developed creative arguments to justify a particular
viewpoint. For an examination of the logic behind the United States' position on
the mandate of the Security Council relevant to four decisions by the International
Court of Justice that make up what is commonly referred to as the Nicaragua Case,
i.e., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgement on the Merits, June 27, 1986); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgement of
Nov. 26 on Jurisdiction and Admissibility); Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 215 (Declaration of Intervention,
Order of Oct.4); and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Provisional Measures, Order of May 10), see
Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
1445, 1453-69 (1985).
19Scholars Question U.S. Interdiction, Newsday, Aug. 15, 1990, News §, at 2.
For example, the United States claimed to be exercising the right of self-defense
when it invaded Panama in December of 1989. Excerpts from Statement by Baker
on U.S. Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, § A, at 19, col. 3. See also Deal is
Reached at U.N. on Panama Seat as Invasion is Condemned, N.Y. Times, § 1, at

6, col. 1.

4 Within days of the invasion, the waters of the Persian Gulf and the desert of
Saudi Arabia were transformed into war zones as the United States deployed air,
land, and sea forces to check further Iraqi aggression in the region. Bush Sends
U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to Confront Iraq, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 8, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6. Although there were strong indications that the
United States was ready, willing, and able to enforce the various Security Council
resolutions, the Bush Administration acknowledged the unprecedented international
cooperation in the matter and encouraged its continuation. U.S. Is Ready to Ask
Soviets to Help with Naval Blockade of Iraq, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1990, § A, at
8, col. 1.
Security Council's Rare Unity May Be Threatened Over U.S. Warships in the
Gulf, supra note 32.
4
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Actions By Air, Sea, or Land Forces

The controversy over the legality of unilateral enforcement of
mandatory sanctions would remain unsettled. On 25 August 1990 the
question became moot when the Security Council passed resolution
665 (1990), which authorized military action to halt maritime trade
with Iraq. 42 Such approval is rare: of the two prior occasions when
the United Nations imposed sanctions, 43 only in the case of Southern
Rhodesia did the Security Council authorize military enforcement."
42 S.C. Res. 665, 45 U.N. SCOR (2938th mtg.) (Resolutions and Decisions of
the Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Resolution 665 (1990)
related, inter alia, to measures aimed at the implementation of resolution 661 (1990).
Adopted on 25 August 1990 by a vote of thirteen in favor, zero against. Two
nations-Cuba and Yemen-abstained. Security Council Resolutions, supra note 26.
For the text of the resolution, see Appendix D.
43 See supra note 17. For the text of the prior resolutions imposing
sanctions on
South Africa see S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977) (imposing a mandatory arms
embargo on South Africa). For the text of the various resolutions addressing the
situation in Southern Rhodesia and imposing gradually more restrictive trade sanctions
see the following resolutions, cited in chronological order to convey the trend in
the Security Council: S.C. Res 217, 20 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of
the Security Council) at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev.I (1965) (imposing voluntary
embargo on oil and oil products); S.C. Res. 221, 21 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council) at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.I (1966) (declaring Southern Rhodesia a threat to international security and providing for the
use of force if necessary to enforce resolution 217 (1965)); S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N.
SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council) at 7-9, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/21/Rev.I (1966) (imposing mandatory economic sanctions under Article 41 of
the U.N. Charter); S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of
the Security Council) at 5-7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.I (1968) (establishing a
monitoring committee, ordering further trade restrictions, and declaring illegality of
Southern Rhodesian passports); S.C. Res. 277, 25 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council) at 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/26 (1970) (ordering
severance of all, e.g., diplomatic, trade, consular, military, etc., relations with
Southern Rhodesia and banning all travel to and from the nation); S.C. Res. 318,
27 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council) at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/28 (1972) (expanding the sanctions monitoring committee's powers); S.C.
Res. 333, 28 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council) at
14, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973) (calling for the termination of insurance on passengers
and freight bound for or originating from Southern Rhodesia); S.C. Res 388, 29
U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council) at 6, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/30 (1974) (expanding insurance embargo established by S.C. Res. 333 (1973));
S.C. Res. 409, 32 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council)
at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977) (prohibition on funding of foreign Southern
Rhodesian agencies).
" When the British colony of Southern Rhodesia made its unilateral declaration
of independence and established a racist government, the British government enlisted
the help of the United Nations to force Southern Rhodesia to adopt majority rule.
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Over a two week period in September, the Security Council ap-

proved three additional resolutions. With resolution 666 (1990), 45 the

Council addressed the potential humanitarian needs created by the
imposition of sanctions and instructed the Secretary-General to collect
information on such situations. 46 Next, responding to reports that
Iraqi troops had entered the embassy of France and other countries
4
in Kuwait, the Council unanimously approved resolution 667 (1990), 1
which demanded the protection of all diplomatic and consular personnel.4 An eighth Council action, resolution 669 (1990), 49 delegated
to the Sanctions Committee primary responsibility for examining
requests for relief from those nations facing economic hardship in
carrying out the sanctions against Iraq. 50
The sanctions, while taking their toll, were by no means airtight,
and concern grew that Iraq could construct a network of airlifts to

The result was a series of Security Council resolutions designed to isolate Southern
Rhodesia among nations, beginning with resolution 217 (1965), supra note 43,
instituting an embargo of oil.
In May of 1966, Britain suspected a particular tanker, the Joanna V, of continuing
deliveries of oil to Southern Rhodesia, and asked the Security Council for authorization to use force to ensure international compliance with resolution 217 (1965).
The Security Council responded with resolution 221 (1966), supra note 43, permitting
the selective use of force to prevent the arrival of tankers as well an explicit
authorization for the detention of the Joanna V if she was found to have delivered
her oil. Record of the Month, U.N. MONTHMY CHRON., May 1966, at 3. See generally,
J. NKALA, THE UNITED NATIONS,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW, AND THE RHODESIAN IN-

DEPENDENCE CRISIS (1985).
4 S.C. Res. 666, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Resolution 666 (1990) related, inter
alia, the determination of humanitarian circumstances referred to in resolution
660 (1990). Adopted at the 2939th meeting of the Security Council on 13 September
1990 by a vote of thirteen in favor and two against, Cuba and Yemen opposed.
Security Council Resolutions, supra note 26. For the text of the resolution, see
Appendix F.
6 Kuwait: The Crisis, supra note 25, at 18.
41 S.C. Res. 667, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Resolution 667 (1990) related, inter
alia, diplomatic personnel and premises. Adopted by unanimous vote of the Security
Council at its 2940th meeting on 16 September 1990. Security Council Resolutions,
supra note 26. For the text of the resolution, see Appendix G.
48Kuwait: The Crisis, supra note 25, at 18.
49 S.C. Res. 669, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Resolution 669 (1990) related, inter
alia, to requests for assistance from nations experiencing economic difficulty in
carrying out resolution 661 (1990) as provided by Article 50. Adopted by unanimous
vote of the Security Council at its 2942nd on 24 September 1990. Security Council
Resolutions, supra note 26. For the text of the resolution, see Appendix H.
10Kuwait: The Crisis, supra note 25, at 20.
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lessen the impact of the embargo on its economy." To address such
possibilities, and to quash contentions that the sanctions mandated
by resolution 661 (1990) were not absolute,5 2 the Security Council
approved resolution 670 (1990) and gradually tightened the economic
isolation of Iraq.3 The resolution called on countries to cooperate
in preventing violations of the embargo, but to do so in accordance
with the Chicago Convention5 4 governing civil aviation." The meeting
that produced resolution 670 (1990) was attended by the Foreign
Ministers of thirteen of its fifteen members, including all five permanent members, underscoring the determination of the world com56
munity.
Repeated refusal by Iraq to comply with the orders to withdraw
compelled the approval of resolution 674 (1990), 5v adopted on 29
October 1990. This resolution cautioned the Iraqis that continued
disregard of the Security Council's directives would result in additional
action under the Charter.5 The resolution also asked countries to
document human rights violations and economic damage resulting

1i See, e.g., Loophole in the Skies, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1990, at 46 (U.K. ed.
at 88).
52 U.N. Near Accord to Assure Cutoff of Iraqi Air Links, N.Y. Times, Sept.
20, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6.
13 S.C. Res. 670, 45 U.N. SCOR (2943d mtg.) (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/670/2943 (1990). Resolution 670
related, inter alia, the applicability of sanctions to all means of transport, including
aircraft. Adopted by the Security Council at its 2943rd meeting on 25 September
1990 by a vote of fourteen in favor, Cuba against. Security Council Resolutions,
supra note 26. For the text of the resolution, see Appendix I.
14 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
55 U.N. Near Accord to Assure Cutoff of Iraqi Air Links, supra note 52. This
meant that while a country could intercept an aircraft and request that it land for
inspection, it could not shoot the aircraft down, as this is explicitly forbidden by
the Chicago Convention. Id.
6 Kuwait: The Crisis, supra note 25, at 21.
57 S.C. Res. 674, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Resolution 674 related, inter alia, the
situation of Kuwaiti and third-state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, to further measures
in the event of Iraqi non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, and to the
good offices of the Secretary-General. Adopted by the Security Council at its 2951st
meeting on 29 October 1990 by a vote of thirteen in favor and zero against, Cuba
and Yemen abstaining. Mideast Tensions: Text of Security CouncilResolution, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1990, § A, at 12, col. 4. For the text of the resolution, see Appendix
J.

5 U.N. Council Holds the Iraqis Liable on Kuwait Damage, N.Y. Times, Oct.
30, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6.
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from the invasion of Kuwait.5 9 An eleventh Council action, resolution
677 (1990), 60 addressed allegations that Iraq was attempting to repopulate Kuwait with its own citizens. 6' The resolution instructed the
Secretary-General to take possession of population records, smuggled
out of Kuwait immediately after the invasionY2
On 29 November 1990, after continued Iraqi disregard for the
United Nations' demand of immediate withdrawal from Kuwait, the
Security Council invoked the ultimate authority of Chapter VII and
approved resolution 678 (1990),63 authorizing the use of force to expel
Iraq from Kuwait if President Saddam Hussein had not removed his
forces by 15 January 1991. The vote marked the second time that
the Security Council had exercised its power to approve the use of
force to counter aggression." To reemphasize the resolve of the
Council, all but two of the members were represented by their Foreign
Ministers. 65

59 Id.

60S.C. Res. 677, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Resolution 677 (1990) related, inter
alia, the population files of Kuwait. Adopted by unanimous vote of the Security
Council at its 2962nd meeting on 28 November 1990. For the text of the resolution,
see Appendix K.
S.C. Res. 678, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council)
at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). Resolution 678 (1990) related, inter alia, to the
authorization members of the United Nations to use "all necessary means" to fully
implement related Security Council resolutions absent an Iraqi indication to do so
prior to 15 January 1991. Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting
on 29 November 1990 by a vote of twelve in favor, two against (Cuba and Yemen),
and one abstention (China). The United Nations: Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraqi Agression, 29 Int'l Legal Mat. 1560 (1990). The text of the resolution
is contained in Appendix L.
6' Security Council Plans Resolution of Kuwaiti Population Files, Reuter Lib.
Rep., Nov. 28, 1990 (available on LEXIS, NEXIS library, Lbyrpt file).
62 Id.
0 See supra note 60.

", U.N. Gives Iraq Until Jan. 15 to Retreat of Face Force; Hussein Says He Will
Fight, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 6. The first instance was in 1950
when the Security Council adopted a resolution endorsing force to repel the North
Korean invasion of South Korea. For an overview of that resolution and subsequent
action by the General Assembly, see generally Reicher, The Uniting for Peace
Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of Its Passage, 20 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1 (1981). For relevant portions of the debates see L. SOHN, CASES ON UNMIED
NATIo~s

LAw

491-509 (2d ed. 1967).

U.N. Gives Iraq Until Jan. 15 to Retreat of Face Force; Hussein Says He Will
Fight, supra note 64. As the United Stated held the Council's rotating Presidency
at the time, Secretary of State James A. Baker III presided over the dramatic
meeting. Id. Thirteen Foreign Ministers also attended the Council meeting that
approved resolution 670 (1990). See supra text accompanying note 56.
61
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While the resolution provided for a forty-seven day pause of good
will, the resolve of the Council to meet the threat to peace caused
by the invasion of Kuwait was clear. The resolution made no explicit
authorization of military force; rather, it empowered members "to
use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council
resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area."
The six-week period provided for by the resolution featured intensive diplomacy which reached a crescendo as the deadline neared.
All efforts proved futile, however, as each and every initiative failed
to persuade Iraq to comply with the resolutions. 67 At a late night
meeting held 16 January 1991, the United States, Britain, and France
informed the other members of the Security Council that, based on
the authority granted by resolution 678 (1990), military action against
Iraq had begun."
The invasion and annexation of Kuwait evoked an unparalleled
response from the community of nations. Through a series of resolutions that methodically navigated the unchartered waters of Chapter VII, the Council established that aggressive war, as condemned
by the United Nations Charter, cannot be waged with impunity.
III.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE COLLECTIVE USE OF FORCE

Sources of International Law Concerning the Use of Force

International law derives from several sources; primary among these
are treaty and custom. 69 While it was once held that nations, like

S.C. Res. 678, supra note 63, operative para. 2.
9 January 1991, the Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz of Iraq and Secretary of
State James A. Baker III of the United States met in Geneva, Switzerland. After
six and one-half hours of talks, both men reported that Iraq was unwilling to
implement the Security Council Resolutions. On 13 January 1991, the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations went to Baghdad, but failed to obtain any concessions
from Iraq. Excerpts from U.S. Report of Its Attempts to Avoid War, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1991, § A, at 16, col. 5. An initiative by France to reach a negotiated end
to the crisis was similarly ignored by Baghdad. Paris Says Its Last-Ditch Peace
Effort Has Failed, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991, § A, at 13, col. 4. Hours before
the deadline passed, a final plea for Iraqi compliance was made by the SecretaryGeneral, speaking for himself, after the Security Council failed to agree on a final
message of its own. Last-Minute Debating, Then Final Plea to Iraq, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1991, § A, at 13, col. 1.
" Allies Tell U.N. Security Council of Attack, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, § A,
at 17, col. 1.
- STATUTE I.C.J. art. 38, para 1.This provision is commonly treated as an
67 On
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individuals, were subject to a preexisting code, i.e., "the Laws of
Nature, and of Nature's God," 70 in current practice, international
law has for the most part become what modern nations have agreed
to in writing. 71 In theory, such international agreements only create
72
obligations between those nations that are the contracting parties.
Multilateral agreements, however, to the extent that a large number
of states actually accept their provisions as binding, can be viewed
as a general source of international law. 7
B.

The Use of Force in Traditional InternationalLaw

74
War is conflict among states carried on by their armed forces
7
and can exist regardless of a formal declaration. Under traditional
international law, the ritual of war was an inherent function of the

authoritative statement of the sources of international law. Along with "international
conventions" and "international custom," Article 38 includes in its listing "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as well as "judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists." Id. See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), RESTATEMENT OF THE FoREiGN RELATioNS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES §
102 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (Tnw)I. See generally L. HENKIN, R. PUGH,
0. SCHACHTER, & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (2d ed.
1987) [hereinafter L. HENKINl; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE
25 (H. Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (5th ed. 1967); G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONO NATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO PBLIc INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d. ed. 1976).

With respect to the primacy of treaties and custom over the other sources deliniated,
e.g., domestic and international judicial decisions or scholarly writings, while it is
true that each of these sources have contributed to the evolution of international
law, rules from such sources do not become general international law until they are
accepted by the community of nations, presumably through either custom or treaty.
Riggs, The United Nations and the Development of InternationalLaw, 1985 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 411, 414 n.9 (1985).
70 The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).

11D.

ON THE LAW OF NATIONS

MOYNUIAN,

9 (1990). See also G.

VON GLAHN,

supra note 69, at 11 (noting that "[in contrast to commentaries of a hundred years
ago, treaties are now generally accepted as a major (and by some the major) source

of international law.").
72

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 69, § 102 comment f.
BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

11T.

IN A NUTSHELL

25

(2d ed. 1990).
71 D. ZIEGLER, WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL

71R. BLEDSOE &

B. BOCZEK, THE

POLmcs 2, (2d ed. 1981)

INTERNATIONAL LAW DICTIONARY, 343

(1987).

Traditionally, the declaration of war was evidence that a state of war existed. In
modern times, however, de facto wars have occurred in the absence of a formal
declaration: the Korean War, The Suez conflict of 1956, the Sino-Indian border war
of 1962, the Indo-Pakistani clashes of 1965 and 1971, the Sino-Vietnamese border
war in 1979, the Falkland War in 1982, and the Iran-Iraq war can all be cited as
examples. Id. at 344.
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state and a prerogative of its unfettered sovereignty.7 6 The right to
go to war was not only considered acceptable behavior by a sovereign
7
nation, but a defining characteristic as well.
Nations were entitled to resort to war either as a means of selfhelp in enforcing an existing or alleged claim based on international
law, or as a justifiable means of altering existing rules of international
law in the name of national interest, regardless of the objective
merits. 78 The latter use of war seemed particularly defensible when
viewed in light of the absence of formal organizations of international
legislation. 79 War waged for either purpose was not considered illegal
under traditional international law.80 Not until the twentieth century
was the perceived legality of war to undergo fundamental change.8'
C.

Early Efforts to Discourage or Outlaw the Use of Force

The Hague Conference of 1899 and the Second Hague Conference
of 1907 were the first formal attempts to limit the use of war as a
justified instrument of foreign policy and an accepted method of
changing the rule of law. 2 The resulting agreement 3 restricted the
use of force in the recovery of debts, and while limited in scope,
was the first treaty to delimit the heretofore uncontrolled sovereignty
of states.84
The creation of the League of Nations, an international organization
committed to the preservation of peace, realized a long sought goal
of many legal scholars.85 The League aimed "to promote international
co-operation and to achieve international peace and security. 8 6 The
Covenant of the League of Nations did not purport to prohibit war;
rather, the League's members agreed not to resort to war against a
member who complied with the requirements of the Covenant re-

76 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 178 (H. Lauterpacht, 7th
ed. 1952).
7
"To declare war is the one of the highest acts of sovereignty." Letter from
Secretary of State Robert Lansing to President Woodrow Wilson (August 16, 1919),
reprinted in H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, n. 1 (1947).
71 20PPENHEIM, supra note 76, at 177.

supra note 69, at 518.
20PPENHEIM, supra note 76, at 178.
L. BLEDSOE & B. BOCZEK, supra note
VON GLAHN, supra note 69, at 518.

" VON GLAHN,
'*
81

12

81 Hague

75, at 345.

Convention II of 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537, 205 Parry's T.S.

250.
84 VON GLAHN,

1sBoWETT,
8

supra note 69, at 518.

THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT

preamble.

15 (1963).
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garding the pacific settlement of disputes. s7 A state violating the
provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes was deemed to have
committed an act of war against the other members of the League
who were then obligated to apply economic sanctions.88 The question
of whether a provision had been violated, however, was left to the
determination of each individual member. A military response to an
act of aggression could be recommended, but the decision on whether
to accept, and how to implement, such a recommendation rested with
89
each member.
The system of collective security as conceived in the Covenant was
not unworkable.90 The decisive test came when Italy invaded Ethiopia
in 1934. 91 The failure of the Covenant to provide for centralized
implementation and enforcement, 92 coupled with reluctance of its
members to enforce the recommended sanctions, contributed to the
demise of the League.93

7

BowETr, supra note 85, at 16

sB The

relevant passage reads:

ARTICLE 16(1) Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard
of its covenants under Article 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed
to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League,
which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all
trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their
nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the
nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other
state, whether a Member of the League or not.
LEAGUE Or NATIONS COVENANT art. 16, para. 1. A detailed discussion on how the
Article 16 mandatory sanctions mechanism functioned is found in M. DoxEY, EcONOMIC SANCTIONS AND ECONoMAc ENFORCEMENT 6-8 (1971) [hereinafter DoxEY,
ENFORCEMENT].
9 BowETT, supra note 85, at 16.
90 Id. In 1925 the League settled a border dispute between Greece and Bulgaria.
Greek troops had invaded Bulgaria and were shelling a Bulgarian city when the
League ordered the Greeks to withdraw or face a naval blockade. The Greeks

eventually withdrew and paid reparations to Bulgaria. The League is credited with
averting a full scale war between the two nations. See generally J. BARROS, THE
LEAGUE oF NATIONS AND THE GREAT POWERS: T E GRFEK-BULGARIAN Ciusis, 1925
(1970).
91 L. HENKIN, supra note 69, at 670.
92 While the implementation of the sanctions was collective, actual enforcement
was left in the hands of the Member States. P. KUYPER, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS 3 (1978), cited in Note, Economic Sanctions: An Effective
Alternative to Military Coercion?, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289, 292 n. 10 (1980).
93 L. HENKIN, supra note 69. In December 1942, Italian and Ethiopian forces
engaged in border skirmishes near Italian Somaliland. Ethiopia appealed to the
League to implement Article 16, but the League deferred to arbitrators. These
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The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand
Pact or Pact of Paris)94 broadened the League's partial ban on war. 95

The Pact prohibited recourse to war as a means of resolving international controversies and renounced the use of war as an instrument

of foreign policy. 96 Under its terms, resort to war was lawful only

in circumstances justifying self-defense and as an instrument of collective response to restrain an aggressor. 97
The Pact failed, however, to establish any means of enforcement. 9

While it can be argued that the absence of such provisions did not

measures failed to prevent the Italian invasion of Ethiopia on 3 October 1935. After
Ethiopia appealed again for League action, the Council appointed a Committee of
Six to investigate Italy's actions and prepare a report. Within 16 days of the invasion,
the Committee of Six submitted a report concluding that Italy had indeed resorted
to war in violation of the Covenant and recommended sweeping embargoes. Despite
the swift response to the aggression, the subsequent failure of the League to effectively
implement the proscribed sanctions exposed its weakness. This weakness led to Italy's
successful defiance of the League and conquest of Ethiopia. The deficiency of the
League of Nations was not in the legal mechanisms of the Covenant, but in the
refusal of the members to enforce those mechanisms. Id. at 670. For a complete
account of the League of Nations and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, see R.
SONTAG, A BROKEN WORLD 1919-1939, at 285-294 (1971) and Spencer, The ItalianEthiopian Dispute and the League of Nations, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 614 (1937).
94

57

Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 2137, 94 L.N.T.S.

", L. BIEDSOE & B.
96

BOCZEK,

supra note 75, at 519.

The relevant text reads as follows:

ARTicLE I The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names
of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution
of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another.
ARTicLE II The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin
they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except
by pacific means.
Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 94, arts. I & II. The treaty became effective on 24
July 1929 and is currently in force. As of 30 June 1986, 64 nations were parties.
L. HENKIN, supra note 69, at 671.
9 VON GLAHN, supra note 69, at 520. It is interesting to note that because only
"war" was mentioned in the Pact, it was possible to circumvent the agreement by
not presenting one's military actions as war. Id. at 522. The framers of the United
Nations attempted to avoid the possibility of such semantical justifications by addressing the "use of force" rather than "war" in drafting the Charter. See infra
note 105 and accompanying text.
" VoN GLAHN, supra note 69, at 520. For a contemporary discussion of the
interpretation of the Pact, see Morris, The Pact of Parisfor the Renunciation of
War: Its Meaning and Effect in International Law, 1929 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. 88-91 cited in voN' GLAHN, supra 69, at 520 n.4.
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leave the Pact entirely impotent, 99 the drafters of the Pact ignored
a fundamental principle of international law: to be effective, a rule
must correspond to the practice of states.'1°
D.

The Use of Force and the Law of the United Nations

The experience of the Second World War, coupled with the failings
of the League of Nations, combined to renew the effort to restrict
the use of force in resolving international conflicts.' °' The Charter
of the United Nations was drafted by the winners of one world war
determined to prevent another. 0 2 The nations that signed the Charter
on 26 June 1945 did so with the hope that a primary function of
the new organization would be the maintenance of international peace
and security.'0 3 Furthermore, the Charter moved beyond the KelloggBriand Pact,' °4 as the signatories renounced not only their right to
go to war, absent circumstances of individual or collective self-defense,
but their right to resort to the threat or use of force as well.

05

These

As von Glahn points out:
To be sure, eminent jurists such as Justice Robert H. Jackson of the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Pact, stating that

. . .,despite

the

absence of an express legal duty of enforcement ... [i]t created substantive
law of national conduct and there resulted a right to enforce it by general
sanctions of international law.
VON

GLAmN, supra note 69, at 520 (footnote omitted).

Id. In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "Legal obligations that
exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive
to the grasp." Ex Parte United States, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922), quoted in VON
GLAHN, supra note 69, at 521 & n.8.
'0, VON GLAHN, supra note 69, at 523.
102 Blodgett, The Future of U.N. Peacekeeping, WASH. Q., Winter 1991, at 204.
103 The Charter provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is:
ARTICLE 1(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
'' VON GLAHN, supra note 69, at 523. It is worth noting that the Charter only
uses the word "war" once-in the preamble ("determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."). Subsequent references use the terms "threat
or use of force" and "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"
in place of the term "war". Id. at 523-24.
'0

101The relevant text provides:
ARTICLE 2(4) All Members

shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
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proscriptions on aggression were to be enforced through a systematic
procedure authorizing collective force against an aggressor nation.' °0
The Charter of the United Nations, having been ratified by virtually

every nation on earth,'07 can be viewed as an example of a lawmaking treaty. As a result, its provision prohibiting the use of force'o,
is considered binding upon all states.'0 9
The Charter vested primary responsibility for the maintenance of

peace and security in the Security Council." 0 The duties of the Council
are two-fold: first, to facilitate peaceful settlements of international
disputes; and second, failing a nonviolent solution, to apply diplo-

matic, economic, and political sanctions, in order to restore the
peace. "1' Far more decisively than the League of Nations," 2 the Se-

curity Council was meant to have both the mandate and authority" 3
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
106 L. HENKIN, supra note 69, at 772.
107RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 69, § 102 comment h. Even the few non-

member nations that remain have tacitly assented to its principles. Id. Incidently,
Iraq was an original signatory of the Charter. L. GOODRICH & A. SIMONS, THE
UNITED NATIONS

AND THE MAINTENANCE

OF INTERNATIONAL

PEACE AND

SECURITY

672 (1955).

1o See supra note 105.
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 69,

§ 102 comment h. The Charter itself
provides for the extension of such provisions to non-members:
ARTICLE 2(6) The Organization shall ensure that states which are not
Members of the Organization act in accordance with these principles so far
as may be for the maintenance of international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6. It is accepted that Article 2(4) has become a principle
of customary international law, binding on all states, with the preemptory character
of jus cogens. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supranote 69, § 102 comment k; L. BLEDSOE
& B. BOCZEK, supra note 75, at 15-16; L. HENKIN, supra note 69, at 677.
110The charge of the Security Council is set out by the Charter as follows:
ARTICLE 24(1) In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the
United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary re-

sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf.
U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.

"I DEPARTMENT

OF STATE,

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON

THE RESULTS

OF THE

SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE 67 (1945 & photo. reprint 1969) [hereinafter REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT].

L. HENKIN, supra note 69, at 772.
The intent of the drafters of the Charter for the role and procedure of the
Security Council in general is discussed in Report of Rapporteurof Committee 111/I
.

"

I to Commission III, reprinted in U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE,

CONFERENCE SERIES

83,

No. 2490, THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION:
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to act quickly in response to threats to world peace in order to bring
about an expeditious resolution of the conflict. 1 4 Moreover, the
Charter clearly recognized the authority of the Security Council over
such matters as binding.' It was for the Security Council to decide
whether or when, as well as to what degree, collective action should
be taken." 6 Such far reaching powers, entrusted to the Security Couninnovation
cil by the drafters of the Charter, represented a1 major
7
over prior attempts at international organization.

E.

THE

CHARTER, THE COUNCIL, AND THE COLLECTIVE USE OF
FORCE

The powers of the Security Council-as they relate to the existence
of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggressionare set forth in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations." '
Consisting of thirteen articles numbered 39 to 51, Chapter VII outlines

(1946) [hereinafter SELECTED DOCUMENTS]. The
"Chapter VIII" discussed in the above referenced work was later designated "Chapter
SELECTED DOCUMENTS AT 734-754

VII" in the final draft of the U.N. Charter.
"The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these
duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XI." U.N. CHARTER art. 24,
para. 2. Considering the Security Council's "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1, there
is wide discretion at the disposal of the Council in the determination of violations,
Doxey, InternationalSanctions: A Frameworkfor Analysis, 26 INT'L ORO. 527, 548
(1972) [hereinafter Doxey, Framework].
,S The relevant article of the Charter of the United Nations states:
ARTICLE 25 The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
"6 N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS at XVI (2d impression 1951 & reprint 1969). This arrangement, when
114

invoked, involved a radical change in status between the Member States and the

United Nations. Ordinarily, the Member States were to retain their full sovereignty
and the Security Council was merely an agent, acting on behalf of these sovereign
states. In contrast, under Chapter VII as conceived by the drafters of the Charter,
the relationship amounted to an irrevocable delegation of authority to the Security
Council and compliance with its decisions became a bounden duty of the Member
States. Id.
"I J. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 111 (6th ed. 1963).
I's Chapter VII is entitled: "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches
of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. The intent of the
drafters of Chapter VII can be ascertained from Report of Rapporteur of Committee

111/3 to Commission III on Chapter VIII, Section B, reprinted in SELECTED DocUmENrs, supra note 111, at 761-771. As noted above, the "Chapter VIII" discussed
in the above referenced work was later designated "Chapter VII" in the final draft
of the U.N. Charter.

GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 21:63

the procedure by which the Security Council is to exercise its authority
to restore international peace and security.
The Charter, in the abstract, limits the sovereignty of the membership of the United Nations in at least two ways: first, the Charter
forbids the use of force except in cases of self-defense, thereby denying
member states their historical power to declare war; 1 9 and second,
the Charter gives the Security Council the power to commit forces
collectively, in the name of all members, 20 thereby denying member
21
states their customary right to remain neutral.'
1.

The Composition of the Council and the Rule of
Unanimity

The Security Council orignally consisted of eleven members, but
eventually expanded to fifteen.'2 Of these fifteen members, five
received permanent representation.1 23 These five permanent members
were either actual, or potential great powers. 24 Article 27 requires
the concurrence of these permanent members on matters affecting
international peace and security; this safeguard was designed to forestall the self-destruction of the organization.' 25 Practice and general
agreement, however, have established that neither an absence, nor
an abstention, by a permanent member is treated as a veto, even
though that member has failed to concur.' 2 Throughout the super-

,,9 D. ZIEGLER, supra note 74, at 304 (although Ziegler also suggests another
limitation, i.e., relating to internal matters of a state perceived by the Council to
be a "threat to the peace," for the purposes of this writing, another source has
been chosen to provide the second limitation). See also supra notes 74-81 and
accompanying text.

120See supra note 115.
121 Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow and the Law of
Neutrality, 17 HAv. INT'L L.J. 249, 251 n.7 (1976). The implications of the customary law of neutrality as it relates to the events of Autumn 1990 is beyond the
scope of this writing, however, for a general overview of neutrality under the Charter,
see generally Id.
11 122 S. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY CotmcI at 4 (1988).
223 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
224

D.

215The

ZiEoLER,

supra note 74, at 306.

relevant passage of Article 27 reads:
ARTICLE 27(3) Decisions of the Security Council on all [non-procedural)
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote ... including the concurring
votes of the permanent members ....
U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. An extensive examination of the rule of unanimity
and other aspects of Security Council voting procedure is contained in S. BAILEY,
VOTINo n Tm SElCRITY CoUNcI (1969).
226 Riggs, supra note 69, at 420 n.28.
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power disputes of the Cold War, the rule of unanimity has prevented
27
such disagreements from consuming the Council.
2.

Article 39 - Determining When to Impose Sanctions

Article 39 directs the Security Council to determine the existence
of circumstances that warrant intervention by the United Nations. 28
The determination of either a threat to the peace, a breach of the
peace, or an act of aggression is crucial and serves as a precondition
to the exercise of the extraordinary coercive powers provided for by
Chapter VII.129 The making of such a determination is treated as an

12

Ziegler has noted:

[The veto provision] was not an oversight. It was a deliberate plan to keep
the organization from destroying itself on the opposition of the major

states. There is little point in trying to mount collective action against a
state that is threatening peace if the major states are not giving that action
their support. The League of Nations discovered this in Manchuria, the
Chaco, and Ethiopia. There is also no point in trying to mount collective
action against a major state. Even before the power of nuclear weapons
was evident, states were aware that such an attempt could end only in a
major war. The unanimity principle acts as a fuse for the U.N. machinerywhen too great a load is placed on the machine, the fuse blows out and
keeps the overload from destroying the machine. The U.N., like the League
of Nations before it, has failed to solve some major international conflicts;
unlike the League, the U.N. was not itself destroyed by this failure.
D. ZIEGLER, supra note 74, at 306-07.
In The text of this article provides:
ARTICLE 39 The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
129 L. GOODRICH & A. SIMONS, supra note 107, at 346. The three terms-threat
to peace, breach of the peace, and act of aggression-are often used loosely and,
at times, interchangeably. There are, however, subtle shades of meaning that differentiate the three, but theses distinctions are not necessarily dispositive. A threat
to the peace implies a situation of potential danger, e.g., one state massing troops
along its border with another state. Conversely, act of aggression implies a threat
to the peace that is no longer potential, but that hostilities have actually taken place
and are of an aggressive nature, e.g., an invasion of one state by another. Finally,
breach of the peace implies a situation between the two others, where hostilities
have erupted, but the Security Council is unwilling, for whatever reason, to impute
the more serious implications that accrue from a finding of aggression. See id. at
354-60.
Incidently, the problem in defining the term "aggression" has long stymied those
who have tried. See, e.g., W. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

606-18 (1957) and L. HENKIN, supra note 69, at 682-86. No attempted definition
proved acceptable to the drafters of the Charter. They proceeded under the as-
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action of considerable importance in the function of the Security
Council,'130 but does not necessarily require sanctions. 3 ' Even after
such a determination, the Security Council may decide that it need
do nothing more than make recommendations and continue efforts
for the peaceful resolution of the dispute. 32 On the other hand, once
such recommendations have been established as ineffectual, the Council must take some enforcement action-be it diplomatic, economic,
33
or military-to restore the peace.
Those who wrote the Charter provided for great freedom on the
3
part of the Security Council in determining what action to take.' '
If confronted with a flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter
as specified by Article 2(4),135 the Council was expected to take without
delay, and to the degree dictated by the situation, actions as provided
by Articles 41 and 42, in order to restore international peace and
security. 36 Moreover, the wording of Article 39, taken together with
subsequent articles, indicates that once a determination has been
reached by the Security Council, and recommended measures have
failed to alleviate the situation, the Council has a responsibility to
37
take some action to restore international peace.
3.

Article 40 - ProvisionalMeasures

Article 40 provides that the Security Council, subsequent to making
the formal determination under Article 39, but prior to deciding upon
what measures shall be taken, may order provisional measures in

sumption that a comprehensive definition would remain elusive and therefore the
preferred course of action was to permit the Security Council unrestricted latitude
in determining whether any of the three situations had been triggered. N. BENTWICH
& A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 88. The General Assembly has taken steps to
define the term, although merely in the form of a recommendation and therefore
not binding upon the Security Council. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 GAOR Supp. (No. 31)
at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
130L. GOODRICH & A. SIMONS, supra note 107, at 346. The mere declaration by
the Council that it might move towards a determination under Article 39 during
the crisis in Palestine in 1948 was an important factor in convincing the parties to
institute a cease fire. Id.
"I2N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 89.
132 Id.
"I

Id. at 94.

13

Report of Rapporteur, SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 113, at 763.

,31See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
,16L. GOODRICH & A. SIMONS, supra note 107, at 393.
"7 N. BENTWICH & A. MARTn,
supra note 116, at 94.
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order to prevent an aggravation of the situation.'3 8 Provisional measures are actions taken by the party or parties causing the threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. 13 9
The decision of what measures are necessary to prevent an aggravation is left to the discretion of the Council and can range from a
call for one party to demobilize a potential invasion force to an order
for cease-fire and withdrawal.,40 The primary intent of Article 40 was
to provide the Council with the means of preventing a mere threat
to the peace from developing into an actual breach of the peace.' 4'
While the Security Council has rarely invoked the letter of Article
42
40, its spirit has been frequently applied.
4.

Article 41 - Sanctions Short of Force

Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to call on members of
the United Nations to apply non-violent sanctions against offenders. 43
While this article details an array of economic sanctions available to
the Security Council, it is not considered a demarcation of every
potential response. 44

138 The

text of the article provides:
ARTICLE 40 In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security
Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.
Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims,
or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take
account of the failure to comply with such provisional measures.
U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
139N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 92.
140 Id.
14,L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO, & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY ANDDocuMENTs 303 (3rd rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter L. GOODRICH,
Co

NTrARy].

Id.
"41 The text of the article provides:
ARTICLE 41 The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures. These include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication and the severance of diplomatic relations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
I- Note, supra note 92, at 294. See also L. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note
141, at 311-12 (noting that although the United States and the United Kingdom
initially feared the article would have a limiting effect on the Council, "the text is
...phrased in permissive terms and cannot be considered as limiting the Council's
powers.").
142
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The concept of employing collective sanctions against a state to
induce it to uphold its international obligations was pioneered by the
League of Nations. 4 Article 16 of the League's Covenant placed the
members under a direct and automatic duty to immediately apply
sanctions not involving the use of force upon an individual determination by each member that an act of aggression had been committed. 4 League members were not entitled to wait for action by
the League Council, nor bound by a decision contrary to their in47
dividual assessment of the situation.
The drafters of the United Nations Charter, however, sought to
avoid this procedural flaw by centralizing the decision-making power
within the Security Council.' No member of the United Nations is
required, nor entitled, to apply enforcement measures absent a Security Council command to do so. 1 49 From the earliest days of the
Charter, however, it was understood that decisions of the Security
Council made under Chapter VII were legally binding on all member
states. 50 Thus, any nation refusing to comply with sanctions imposed
by the Council, would itself be in violation of the Charter and subject
to disciplinary action.'-'
5. Article 42 - Collective Force
Article 42 provides the Security Council unrestricted discretion in
52
deciding when a situation requires the application of collective force.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
N. BENTWICH & A. MARTI, supra note 116, at 93. See also supra text
accompanying notes 92 & 93 (highlighting the fatal flaw of the Covenant in leaving
the actual decision making process up to the individual members which led to uneven
enforcement.)
141N. BENTWICH & A. MARTN, supra note 116, at 93.
14,

'46

'4,

See L.

GOODRICH, COm NTARY, supra note
A. MARTIN, supra note 116,

141, at 311.

at 93.
I" The position of the United States on the matter can be found in REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT, supra note Ill, at 78-79.
"I See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. An additional article that is
relevant to the current discussion states:
ARTicLE 2(5) All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance
in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall
refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations
is taking preventive or enforcement action.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5. The penalty prescribed by the Charter for violations
of its principles is expulsion; the pertinent article provides:
ART cILE 6 A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated
the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the
Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council.
U.N. CHARTER art. 6.
1S2 The text of the article reads:
49 N. BENTWICH &
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Like the previous article, Article 42 contains an enumeration of
possible measures but is not meant to be inclusive.'
While members of the League of Nations were under an automatic
obligation to apply certain non-military sanctions, at no time were
they required to apply military measures, even at the request of the
5 4
League Council.
Under the Charter, however, not only are members bound to
contribute to military measures when so requested by the Council,'
but once the Security Council has authorized military sanctions, no
member may remain neutral. 5 6 While this provision ensures that ample
resources will be at the Security Council's disposal during a crisis,
it by no means obliges all members to participate in military actions.' 7
The Council may resort to force when measures previously taken
have proved inadequate to accomplish the Council's aims. Additionally, if the Council considers that previous measures would be inadequate,' S1 it need not wait for empirical evidence to justify the use
of force. 5 9 Moreover, while there is no requirement that all available
economic and diplomatic sanctions be applied before resorting to
force, 16 neither is there a requirement that, if measures short of force
should fail, the Council must take military action. 61 So long as the

42 Should the Security Council consider the measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate, or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such actions by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
ML. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note 141, at 315. See also supra note 136
and accompanying text (Article 41 sanctions are not limited to those listed in the
Article).
'5 N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 95.
'"See supra notes 115 & 143 and accompanying text.
"m N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 95. See also supra note 121
and accompanying text (regarding effect on the customary law of neutrality.)
,17
It is for the Council to make such requests. Obviously a nation with no navy
could not substantively contribute to a naval blockade, but other assistance from
such a nation, e.g., financial or medical, may be requested. See generally L. GOODRICH
& A. SIMONS, supra note 107, at 433-39.
"I'N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 96.
,19L. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note 141, at 314. The San Francisco Conference unanimously agreed that "in the case of a flagrant aggression imperiling
the existence of a member of the Organization, enforcement measures should be
taken without delay, and to the full extent required by the circumstances." Id. at
314 n.96 (citing 12 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 507 (1945)).
N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 96.
ARTICLE

160

161

Id.
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Council has taken some action, its obligations for the maintenance
of world peace have been met.6
6.

Article 43 - Military Contribution of Members

Unlike the collective security arrangement of the League of Nations,
which provided for sanctions to be enforced independently by the
individual action of its members, the system of the Charter rests on
military sanctions to be applied by the Security Council itself. 63 In
order to ensure the Security Council sufficient means to apply a
military option, Article 43 allows members to make available various
methods of military assistance.'" The drafters of the Charter envisaged
an enforcement system of national contingents provided by the members, but only in accordance with agreements negotiated in advance. 65
The focus of the agreements was to be on the number and type of
forces, the degree of readiness, the general location of forces, and
the nature of military facilities and assistance.'" No agreements as
described in Article 43 have been concluded, and as there are no

See also supra note 137 and accompanying text.
BENTWICH & A. MARniN, supra note 116, at 98.
114 Article 43 reads:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available
to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement
or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of
passage, necessary for the purposes of maintaining international peace and
security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general locations, and the nature of
the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible
on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between
the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and
groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory
States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 43.
161 L. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note 141, at 318. The architects of the
Charter considered two alternatives to the system developed in Article 43. The first
and most radical was to establish an international force which would be maintained
by the United Nations. This idea was rejected as too great a violation of national
sovereignty. The second option was to delegate enforcement of Council actions to
a temporary coalition convened anew with each passing crisis. As this was the basic
scheme of the League of Nations, prior experience had already proved it ineffective.
Id. at 317-18.
'6 U.N. CHARTER, art. 38, para. 2; N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116,
at 98-99.
162Id.
163

See N.
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alternative methods of mobilizing military commitments from members, the scheme has proved to be a major weakness in the Charter. 67
7.

Article 44 - Representation of Non-Council Members

Article 44 provides those members who are not sitting on the
Security Council at the time of a decision to use force an opportunity
l
to present their views before they are called upon to commit forces.'
If the Council does not explicitly call upon the military forces of a
member, the member has no right to invoke Article 44.169 Since the

special agreements of Article 43 have not been concluded, the provisions of Article 44 have yet to be applied.

70

8. Article 45 - Air Force Contingents

Article 45 recognizes the benefits of maintaining air force contingents immediately available for urgent military action.' 7 ' The ability
of air forces to provide "immediate striking power over long dis-

tances" warranted a specific provision and was not meant to exclude
the use of other branches of service. 72 Rather than creating an
international force, the drafters provided for national air force contingents to be available for joint enforcement action. 73 As this Article

& A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 98-99.
The text reads as follows:
ARTICLE 44 When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall,
before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces
in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that
Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the
Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of the Member's
armed forces.

16, N. BENTWICH
",

U.N.

CHARTER art. 44.
BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 100; L. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note 141, at 327; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 111, at 94.

- N.

L. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note 141, at 327.
The text of the article reads:
ARTICLE 45 In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military
measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air force
contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength
and readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined actions
shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement
or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
U.N. CHARTER art. 45.
170
','

PRESiDENT, supra note 111, at 97.
GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note 141, at 328.

172 REPORT TO THE
173

L.
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is also framed within the limits of Article 43, the value of Article
45 will depend on the contents of the special agreement or agreements
74
yet to be negotiated.
9.

Articles 46 & 47 - The Military Staff Committee

The Military Staff Committee was intended to serve as a general
staff for the Security Council and is responsible for assisting the
17
Council with strategic planning on United Nations military matters.
The Committee has no authority other than what is delegated to it
and is fully subordinate to the Security Council. 176 Due to the foreseeability of rotating membership on the Council reducing the efficiency of its operations, Article 47177 established fixed membership:
consisting of the Chiefs of Staff, or their designated representatives,
from each of the permanent members.178 Subordinate to the Security
N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116 at 101. The notion of a United
Nations air force reemerged during the debate on how best to enforce resolution
660 (1990). See Wright, Forget Kuwait: A Kinder, Gentler Gulf Strategy; Punitive
Bombing with U.N. Sanction, 203 NEw REPuBLic 19, at 19 (Dec. 3, 1990).
'7, L. GOODRICH, CoMrNTARY, supra note 141, at 329. The text of Article 46
reads:
ARTiCLE 46 Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the
Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
U.N. CHARTER art. 46.
,76 N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 101.
'7 Article 47 reads:
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and
assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's
military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the
regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of
the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives.
Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the
Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when
the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security
Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal
of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces
shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security
Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may
establish regional subcommittees.
U.N. CHARTER art. 47.
N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 102. This restriction was highly
offensive to many of the non-permanent members. L. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY,
supra note 141, at 330.
174

17,
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Council, the Committee is to prepare plans for the application of
Article 43. Considering the difficulty in identifying long-range threats
to international peace and security, planning by the Committee must
79
necessarily be limited to that of the most general kind.
10.

Article 48 - Participationin Sanctions

Article 48 restates and amplifies the obligation of members to carry
out resolutions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. I'0 The drafters recognized the distinction
between the world-wide obligations of the permanent members and
the more restricted scope of the lesser powers, whose military effectiveness is likely to be negligible in areas outside their home
territories.'' Thus, while no member can claim a right of exemption
from participation in sanctions, neither can the Security Council be
obligated to devise sanctions that affect every member equally. 8 2
Paragraph one grants the Council full discretion to determine whether
participation is necessary from an individual member and to choose
which members shall actually take part in a particular action. 8 3
Additionally, recognizing the importance of international agencies
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the
implementation of economic sanctions, paragraph two directs members to exercise their responsibilities to such organizations in fur84
therance of Security Council objectives.
11.

Articles 49 & 50 - Sharing the Burden of Sanctions

Article 49 recognizes that the obligation of all members to provide
enforcement of Security Council actions in the preservation of peace
is, to a large extent, dependent on the corresponding obligation of
individual members to afford each other mutual assistance in order

11

L.

GOODRICH,

COMMENTARY,

supra note 141, at 329.

180Id. at 334. Article 48 provides:

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by
all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international
agencies of which they are members.
U.N. CHARTER art. 48.
"'
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 111, at 98.
182 N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, supra note 116, at 104.
183

Id.

184

Id.
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to alleviate any hardships created by the directives of the Council.",
Since a member may need military or financial assistance in order
to fully implement measures required of them, the Charter provides
that no other member may refuse to provide such assistance when
requested.'" If a member or non-member discovers that they are
confronted with special economic difficulties as a result of action
decided upon by the Security Council, the Charter provides for recourse in Article 50.187
While Article 50 avoids specifics, the drafters recognized that collective economic measures create substantial costs for those employing
them ""' and identified the need for some machinery to distribute
equitably the economic burden. 8 9 It is clear, however, that the remedies of Articles 49 and 50 are not available to the state against
which sanctions are directed. 190
12. Article 51
A perfect system of collective security would prohibit any use of
force, except by the organization appointed guardian of the peace; 9'
to give individual states any discretionary authority to rationalize a
resort to arms invites abuse. 92 Nevertheless, Article 51 provides for
the right of individual or collective self-defense 93 as a safeguard to
lS

The text of the Article reads:
ARTIcLE 49 The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording

mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security
Council.
U.N. CHARTER art. 49.
,s6 N. BENTWICH & A. MARXTI, supra note 116, at 105.
IS?

The Charter states:

ARTICLE 50 If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are
taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the
United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic
problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the
right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those
problems.
U.N.

CHARTER art.
GOODRICH,
"19 N. BENTWICH
190 L. GOODRICH,
9' N. BENTWICH

In L.

50.

supra note 141, at 341.
supra note 116, at 105.
supra note 141, at 341 n.177.
supra note 116, at 106.
192Modem history is crowded with aggressions justified as self-defense: the German
invasion of Poland in 1939; the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia
in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979; and the American invasions of Grenada in 1983
and Panama in 1989.
193 In order to assuage the insecurities of the world powers at the time of its
inception, the U.N. Charter requires that the five permanent members concur on
all non-procedural questions. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. See also supra note
125 and accompanying text.
CommENTARY,
& A. MATIN,
CommENTARY,
& A. MARnN,
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the potential inability of the Security Council to act efficiently in the

face of an international crisis,94 a reality that paralyzed the Council
throughout the Cold War. 95
While the provision is couched in temporary terms, viz., self-defense
is permitted "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security,"'

96

varying interpreta-

tions may arise when determining precisely what actions by the Security Council would be sufficient to discontinue the right to individual
or collective self-defense.1 97
IV.

CHAPTER VII AND THE INVASION

OF KUWAIT

When the United Nations Charter was ratified, it was generally
held to have outlawed aggressive war.198 On paper, the plans for
maintaining peace and security-as embodied in Chapter VII of the
It has been observed:
To many of the architects of the Charter, Article 51 seemed necessary to
provide the basis for measures of self-defense in case the Security Council
was unable to discharge its responsibilities because of disagreements among
major powers. It has been the fact of such disagreements, particularly
between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, that has seemed to
justify the extensive resort to the right which Article 51 recognizes.
L. GOODRICH, CoImENTARY, supra note 141, at 352. See also Bernstein, The United
Nations Security Council Seems Bent on Irresolution, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1984,
§ 4, at 5,col. 1 (noting that "[t]hroughout its history .. the Security Council has
been hampered by the difficulty of getting the Soviet Union and the United States
to agree to common programs.").
191
The text reads:
ARTICLE 51 Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right

of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take
at any time such action as itdeems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
19 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
191L. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note 141, at 352-53. Distinctions must be
drawn between positive action, which would mean an affirmative step towards
resolving the dispute; no action, which would signify those situations which have
not yet been addressed by the Council; and negative action, which would refer to
an actual vote taken by the Council with the result that nothing is done to help
resolve the situation. J. CASTANEDA, supra note 21, at 210 n.25.
'" Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH L. Rnv. 1620, 1620 (1984).
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Charter-were quite an improvement over what had been attempted
before. ' 9 Unfortunately, what is down on paper is not necessarily
what is done in practice.2 The system of security envisaged by the
drafters was restricted by the veto, and thereby hinged upon the
continued cooperation of the permanent members of the Security
Council. 20 This interaction, however, was not forthcoming, as Chapter VII became one of the first casualties of the Cold War.
Forty-five years later, on the heels of the superpower reconciliation,
comes the compelling case of Kuwait and the long-awaited opportunity
to move another step closer to the end of aggressive war. Perhaps
paradoxically, the collective use of force is essential to the maintenance
of international law under the Charter; at times it is necessary to
wage war in order to preserve peace.
On two occasions during the debate over Iraq and Kuwait, the
Security Council ordered the collective use of force in the name of
international law and as authorized by Chapter VII.2 Prerequisite
to the exercise of this authority is the obligatory determination by
the Council that one of the three situations described by Article 39
exists. 24 Following such a conclusion, Article 40 allows provisional
measures to be imposed at the option of the Council.2 In the current
crisis, resolution 660 (1990)2 fulfilled both functions. Framed in the

I"R.

CoUNcEL: A STUDY IN ADOLESCENCE 66-67 (1973).
supra note 74 at 304.
20, R. HIscocKs, supra note 199, at 67.
m Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Former United States Ambassador to the United
Nations, describes the dynamic of the Cold War Security Council: "The Communist
powers had clients, we had clients; what our client wanted we wanted, the more so
if 'their' clients ... wanted otherwise." D. MOYNnmN, supra note 71, at 3. Indeed,
200

D.

HISCOCKS, THE SECURITY

ZIEGLER,

the sole prior attempt to use the collective security arrangements of Chapter VII
was in response to what was in essence a Cold War conflict. See generally L. HENKIN
supra note 69, at 776-781.
2w The first instance, resolution 665 (1990), involved enforcement of resolution
661 (1990) through limited naval interdiction of shipping. See supra, note 42. The
second occasion, resolution 678 (1990), authorized member states to employ all
"necessary means" to reverse the Iraqi aggression into Kuwait. See supra note 63.
A third occasion, the approval of resolution 670 (1990), which involved the application
of resolution 661 (1990) to all means of transportation, including aircraft, was not
as much an authorization of force, but a clarification of the scope of the prior
resolution. See supra note 53.
204 Article 39 states, inter alia, "The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression .... ." U.N.
CHARTER art. 39. See also text accompanying notes 128-137.
20, See supra text accompanying notes 138-142.
2w Supra note 14. See infra Appendix A for the full text of the resolution.
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language of the Charter, the second preambular paragraph concluded
"that there exists a breach of international peace and security as
regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait." 2 7
In addition, the operative paragraphs of the resolution contained
two provisional measures: one that demanded Iraq initiate an immediate withdrawal of forces, and another that called upon Iraq and
Kuwait to begin negotiations to resolve the dispute peaceably. 20 8 At
this stage in the crisis, the Council was addressing only the parties
involved, 2°9 attempting to prevent an escalation of the hostilities.
Upon the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, 21 0 the Council decided
that additional action would be necessary and approved resolution
661 (1990); the vehicle for the application of the non-military sanctions
permitted by Article 41 against Iraq. 21 I The language of the resolution
was direct: a total severance of economic relations between Iraq and
the rest of the world would be maintained until operative paragraph
2 of resolution 660 (1990) was implemented.
Despite the clarity of the Security Council's resolve to take nonmilitary action, one paragraph created confusion about the authority
of members to employ military force in the enforcement of the non21 2
military sanctions. The United States used the paragraph in question
to support its position that unilateral enforcement action was in fact
self-defense 2l3 under Article 51.214

-0 S.C. Res. 660, supra note 14, preambular para. 2.
S.C. Res. 660, supra note 14, operative paras. 2 & 3.

See supra text accompanying note 139.
110Declared by the Council to be without basis in international law. See supra
note 24.
211 See infra Appendix B. At this point the Council could have bypassed economic
sanctions and proceeded to exercise a military option under Article 42. See supra
text accompanying note 159. In 1950 at the beginning of the Korean War, the only
other collective security effort by the Council, economic sanctions were passed over
as military measures were decided within two days of the North Korean invasion.
L. HENK N, supra note 69, at 777.
232 The resolution affirmed the "inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence ... in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. S.C. Res. 660, supra
note 14, preambular para. 6.
21, Both individual and collective self-defense are addressed in Article 51. The
right of collective self-defense can be conceived of in two ways. First, states can
collectively exercise their individual right to self-defense based on some shared interest,
i.e., a common border or common enemy. An additional conceptualization of
collective self-defense exists in the right of one state to come to the assistance of
another state that is exercising its individual right to self-defense, on a general interest
of international peace and security rather than any specific shared interest. From
both the discussions in San Francisco in 1945 and in subsequent practice by U.N.
209
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The controversy was reduced to an academic argument when the
Council authorized the use of maritime force to halt trade with Iraq. 21"
Although Article 42 is not explicitly cited as the basis for such action,
the wording of the resolution2 16 certainly indicates the Council was
217
continuing to abide by the process of the Charter.
The final authorization for the collective use of force came in
resolution 678 (1990).218 Again the text of the resolution bears no
mention of any particular Article under which enforcement action
was based, rather the Council makes reference to Chapter VII in
general. 219 One paragraph in particular, however, points to the Article
42 for authority to use force. Despite the discretion allowed the

Members, it is clear that the latter is the more accurate interpretation of Article 51.
L. GOODRICH, COMMENTARY, supra note 141, at 348.
214 Regular State Department Briefing from Margaret Tutwiler, (Aug. 14, 1990)
(transcript available from Federal News Service, LEXIS, NEXIS library, Fednew
file) ("While U.N. resolution 661 on sanctions against Iraq does not provide legal
basis for interdiction, the request for such action by the exiled Emir of Kuwait to
implement the resolution does provide such a basis under Article 51 of the Charter.").
In a newspaper commentary, it was suggested that the inclusion of this paragraph,
though "innocuous at first sight," was the result of a "brilliant legal stratagem"
on the part of the United States. For several decades the interpretation of Article
51 had been that the right of self-defense was thought to be suspended when the
Security Council took appropriate action. See supra note 194 and accompanying
text. The inclusion of a reaffirmation of Article 51, however, would theoretically
allow one to argue that the right was again recognized, despite the Security Council's
actions, and provided the United States with a concrete, albeit technical, argument
in favor of unilateral action. Wells, Kuwait Request Brings a New Word into
InternationalLaw, The Independent, Aug. 14, 1990, Foreign News §, at 9. See also,
Regular State Department Briefing from Richard Boucher, (Aug. 17, 1990) (transcript
available from the Federal News Service, LEXIS, NEXIS library, Fednew file)
(expressly citing the reaffirmation of Article 51 as consistent with international law).
212 S.C. Res. 665, supra note 42, operative para. 1. The full text of this resolution
is contained in Appendix E.
216 For example, both Article 42 and resolution 665 use the language of proportionality. The Charter provides that the Council may take such a action "as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace..." (emphasis added) U.N.
CHARTER, art. 42. Similarly, resolution 665 (1990) calls upon members to "use such
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary ....
S.C. Res 665, supra note 42, operative para. I (emphasis added).
217 In addition to the implication of Article 42, two other references to the Charter
were made by resolution 665 (1990): Article 49 and the requirement of mutual
assistance appeared in the third operative paragraph, as well as a request in the
fourth operative paragraph that members exercising military measures under the
authority of the Security Council coordinate their actions through the Military Staff
Committee.
218 See supra note 63. Appendix L contains the full text of this resolution.
219 S.C. Res. 678, supra note 63, preambular para. 5.
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Security Council in determining if and when military measures are
to be applied,2" the second operative paragraph appears to be a
statement that the Council considered non-military measures to have
proved inadequate.'
Regardless of the source of authority within Chapter VII, resolution
678 (1990) provides members with what appears to be an unrestricted
mandate for the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait,m the only express
qualification being that any operations under the resolution be delayed
until 15 January 1991.2 Using the same language of proportionality
as the Charter,2 the Council provides a broad mandate for the
application of military measures in the name of the community of
nations.
The scope of such language, however, lends itself to both a broad
and narrow interpretation. On one hand, the command to implement
the twelve relevant resolutions seems to pivot on Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwaiti territory. Conversely, the reference to peace and security
in the region may support an argument that maintains a militarized
Iraq is a de facto threat to regional stability.25
Other questions raised by resolution 678 (1990) center around implications of the Charter's provisions for the Military Staff Committee
and national contingents of troops under United Nations' command.
Notwithstanding the Council's request that military action be coor-

See supra text accompanying notes 158-162.

" Article 42 provides for military action should the Council "consider that
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
m The second operative paragraph of the resolution authorizes members to "use
all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990)
and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security
in the area." S.C. Res. 678, supra note 63, operative para. 2.
20 See supra text accompanying note 63.
- Compare U.N. CATER art. 42 (which permits the Council to take such action
"as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.") with
S.C. Res. 678, supra note 63, operative para. 2 (authorizing members to "use all
necessary means to [compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait] and to restore international peace and security in the area.").
2
Just such a debate arose shortly after the United Nations' coalition began the
bombardment of Iraq and Kuwait. Some argued that massive strikes against Baghdad
and other cities exceeded the authorization to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait,
further insisting that invasion by coalition forces should necessarily stop at the
Kuwaiti border with Iraq. Others maintained that the mandate to restore peace and
security to the area equally necessitated the coalition insure the Iraqi army was
incapable of mounting another aggressive action, even if this meant pursuit into
Iraq. Legitimate Aims of the Allies, The Independent, Jan. 23, 1991, at 18.
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dinated with the Military Staff Committee,22 control of military
operations in the Persian Gulf remained entirely in the hands of the
nations taking part in the enforcement action227 As the Articles that
create the Military Staff Committee also establish its subordination
to the Security Council,2n there is little basis for the position that
the Military Staff Committee must direct military operations conducted in the name of the Security Council. Arguably, it is necessary
for the Security Council to maintain some semblance of control over
collective security measures; conceivably, this will be a lesson learned
by experience and applied to future crises. Similarly, a unified armed
force under Security Council command is not necessary to the exercise
of the military measure contained in Article 42. 2 9 The purpose of
these provisions was to ensure the availability of sufficient military
resources to permit the Security Council to enforce any of its decisions,

a problem not faced in the current crisis .230
It is important to keep in mind that the Charter is a flexible
document. Far from being a rigid set of rules to be adhered to
blindly, the Charter gives the Security Council the freedom and
discretion to apply Chapter VII in a manner deemed appropriate to
a given situation.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

FuTuRE

The Council's actions in addressing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
are highly significant. After nearly fifty-years of ineffectiveness, the
world has witnessed the Charter's distinction between force used
aggressively and force used collectively. Well within the legal boundaries of the Security Council's power to authorize military action for
S.C. Res. 665 (1990), supra note 42, operative para. 4.
e.g., Hayes-Holgate, U.N. Must reclaim Role in the Gulf, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Feb. 12, 1991, at 19.
n' See supra notes 175 & 177 and accompanying text.
29 Scheffer, United Nations and InternationalLaw are Flying High, But Real Test
is to Come, L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 1990, part M, at 2, col. 3.
On the day before the United Nations deadline expired, there were between
615,000 and 660,000 troops available from 28 nations to enforce the Security Council
resolutions. The 28 nations that had sent ships, aircraft, or personnel to the region
were: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Greece, the Gulf Cooperation Council (consisting
of troops from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates),
Honduras, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan,
Portugal, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, Spain, Syria, Turkey, and the
United States. Facing Off, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1990, at A15.
2

221See,
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the preservation of international peace and security, the resolutions
that addressed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have advanced the capability
of international law, as embodied by the Charter of the United
Nations, to confront aggression. Now that the war between Iraq and
the Allied coalition is over, numerous opportunities exist for an
expanded role for the United Nations. 23' With continued cooperation
between the members of the international community, its ability to
prevent aggression will be advanced as well.
Christopher John Sabec

"3 See, e.g.,Scheffer, Roles for the United Nations After the Gulf War, U.N.
ASS'N OF THE U.S.A., OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 3 (1991).
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APPENDIX A
RESOLUTION 660 (1990)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting
on 2 August 1990
The Security Council,
Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military
forces of Iraq,
Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and
security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United
Nations,
1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally
all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August
1990;
3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive
negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all
efforts in this regard, and especially those of the Arab League States;
4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps
to ensure compliance with the present resolution.
S.C. Res. 660, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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APPENDIX B
RESOLUTION 661 (1990)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2933rd meeting on
6 August 1990
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990,
Deeply Concerned that the resolution has not been implemented
and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss
of human life and material destruction,
Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity of Kuwait,
Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its
readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990),
Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence,
in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph
2 of resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the
legitimate Government of Kuwait;
2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to
secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990)
and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
3. Decides that all States shall prevent:
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and
products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the
date of the present resolution;
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which
would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and
any dealing by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories
in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and
exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including
in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purpose
of such activities or dealings;
(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories
or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including
weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating
in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for
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medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to
any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for
the purpose of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or
Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories
which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of
such commodities or products;
4. Decides that all states shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or
economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons
within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other
funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments
exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs;
5. Calls upon all States, including states non-members of the
United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of
the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or
license granted before the date of the present resolution;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of
the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council,
to undertake the following tasks and to report of its work to the
Council with its observations and recommendations;
(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation
of the present resolution which will be submitted by the SecretaryGeneral;
(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the
action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the
provisions laid down in the present resolution;
7. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Committee
in the fulfillment of its task, including supplying such information
as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present
resolution;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in
the Secretariat for the purpose;
9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above,
nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the
legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States;
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(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies;
(b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on
the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first
report to be submitted within thirty days;
11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its
efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.
S.C. Res. 661, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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APPENDIX C

RESOLUTION 662
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2934th meeting
on 9 August 1990

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) and 661 (1990),
Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive
and eternal merger" with Kuwait,
Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located
on 1 August 1990,
Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end
and restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
Kuwait,
Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait,
1. Decides that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form
and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null
and void;
2. Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized
agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any
action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition
of the annexation;
3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to
annex Kuwait;
4. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its
efforts to put an early end to the occupation.
S.C. Res. 662, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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APPENDIX D
RESOLUTION 664
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2934th meeting
on 9 August 1990
The Security Council,
Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait
and resolutions 660, 661 and 662,
Deeply concerned for the safety and well being of third state
nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,
Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this manner under international
law,
Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent
consultations with the Government of Iraq following the concern and
anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on 17 August 1990,
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:
1. Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and
grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such
nationals;
2. Further demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the
safety, security or health of such nationals;
3. Reaffirms its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that annexation
of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore demands that the
government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic
and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity
of their personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on
compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time.
S.C. Res. 664, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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RESOLUTION 665
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2938th meeting
on 25 August 1990
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and 664
(1990) and demanding their full and immediate implementation,
Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq
which imperils the existence of a Member State and to restore the
legitimate authority, and the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of the
above resolutions,
Deploringthe loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait and determined to prevent further such losses,
Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with
resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (199) and 664 (1990) and in
particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using Iraqi
flag vessels to export oil,
1. Calls upon those Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces in the area
to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as
may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt
all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and
verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990);
2. Invites Member States accordingly to co-operate as may be
necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of resolution 661
(1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in
accordance with paragraph 1 above;
3. Requests all States to provide in accordance with the Charter
such assistance as may be required by the States referred to in
paragraph 1 of this resolution;
4. Further requests the States concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of this resolution using as
appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee and after
consultations with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the
Security Council and its Committee established under resolution 661
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(1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of this
resolution;
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
S.C. Res. 665, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -,

U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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APPENDIX F

RESOLUTION 666
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2939th meeting
on 13 September 1990

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 661 (1990), paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of which
apply, except in humanitarian circumstances, to foodstuffs,
Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population of
Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering,
Noting that in this respect the Committee established under paragraph 6 of that resolution has received communications from several
Member States,
Emphasizing that it is for the Security Council, alone or acting
through the Committee, to determine whether humanitarian circumstances have arisen,
Deeply concerned that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations
under the Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of the
safety and well-being of third state nationals, and reaffirming that
Iraq retains full responsibility in this regard under international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United nations,
1. Decides that in order to make the necessary determination
whether or not for the purposes of paragraph 3 (c) and paragraph
4 of resolution 661 (1990) humanitarian circumstances have arisen,
the Committee shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq
and Kuwait under constant review;
2. Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security
Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect to third State nationals and
reaffirms that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and wellbeing in accordance with international humanitarian law including,
where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention;
3. Requests, for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
resolution, that the Secretary-General seek urgently, and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other
appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, such information to be communicated by the Secretary-General to the Committee regularly;
4. Requests further that in seeking and supplying such information
particular attention will be paid to such categories of persons who
might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, ex-
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pectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly;
5. Decides that if the Committee, after receiving the reports from
the Secretary-General, determines that circumstances have arisen in
which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to
Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, it will report
promptly to the Council its decision as to how such need should be
met;
6. Directs the Committee that in formulating its decisions it should*
bear in mind that foodstuffs should be provided by the United Nations
in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross
or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them
or under their supervision in order to ensure that they reach the
intended beneficiaries;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Kuwait and Iraq
in accordance with the provisions of this and other relevant resolutions;
8. Recalls that resolution 661 (1990) does not apply to supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes, but in this connection recommends that medical supplies should be exported under the strict
supervision of the Government of the exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian agencies.
S.C. Res. 666, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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RESOLUTION 667
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2940th meeting
on 16 September 1990
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 650 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664
(1990), 665 (1990) and 656 (1990),
Recalling the Vienna Conventions of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic
relations and of 24 April 1963 on consular relations, to both of which
Iraq is a party,
Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel is contrary
to the decisions of the Security
Council, the international Conventions mentioned above and international law,
Deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the
Security Council and the provisions of the Conventions mentioned
above, has committed acts of violence against diplomatic missions
and their personnel in Kuwait,
Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in
Kuwait and at the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these premises,
Considering that the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive
acts and a flagrant violation of its international obligations which
strike at the root of the conduct of international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence
against foreign nationals or against any diplomatic or consular mission
in Kuwait or its personnel,
Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and for Article 25
of the Charter of the United Nations,
Furtherconsidering that the grave nature of Iraq's actions, which
constitute a new escalation of its violations of international law,
obliges the Council not only to express its immediate reaction but
also to consult urgently to take further concrete measures to ensure
Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Strongly condemns aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against
diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction
of foreign nationals who were present in those premises;
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2. Demands the immediate release of those foreign nationals as
well as all nationals mentioned in resolution 664 (1990);
3. Furtherdemands that Iraq immediately and fully comply with
its international obligations under resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990)
and 664 (1990) of the Security Council, the Vienna Conventions on
diplomatic and consular relations and international law;
4. Furtherdemands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and
well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in
Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic and
consular missions in the performance of their functions, including
access to their nationals and the protection of their person and
interests;
5. Reminds all States that they are obliged to observe strictly
resolutions 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990) and 666
(1990);
6. Decides to consult urgently to take further concrete measures
as soon as possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in response
to Iraq's continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the
Council and of international
law.
S.C. Res. 667, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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APPENDIX H
RESOLUTION 669
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2942nd meeting
on 24 September 1990
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990,
Recalling also Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of requests for
assistance have been received under the provisions of Article 50 of
the Charter of the United Nations,
Entrusts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990)
concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of
examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50
of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations
to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.
S.C. Res. 669, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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APPENDIX I
RESOLUTION 670
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2943rd meeting
on 25 September 1990
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664
(1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), and 667 (1990),
Condemning Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait, its failure to
rescind its actions and end its purported annexation and its holding
of third State nationals against their will, in flagrant violation of
resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990) and 667 (1990) and of
international humanitarian law,
Condemning further the treatment by Iraqi forces of Kuwaiti nationals, including measures to force them to leave their own country
and mistreatment of persons and property in Kuwait in violation of
international law,
Noting with grave concern the persistent attempts to evade the
measures laid down in resolution 661 (1990),
Further noting that a number of States have limited the number
of Iraqi diplomatic and consular officials in their countries and that
others are planning to do so,
Determinedto ensure by all necessary means the strict and complete
application of the measures laid down in resolution 661 (1990),
Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and the provisions
of Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Affirming that any acts of the Government of Iraq which are
contrary to the above-mentioned resolutions or to Articles 25 or 48
of the Charter of the United Nations, such as Decree No. 377 of
the Revolution Command Council of Iraq of 16 September 1990, are
null and void,
Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance with Security
Council resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic
means,
Welcoming the Secretary-General's use of his good offices to advance a peaceful solution based on the relevant Security Council
resolutions and noting with appreciation his continuing efforts to this
end,
Underlining to the Government of Iraq that its continued failure
to comply with the terms of resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662
(1990), 664 (1990), 666 (1990) and 667 (1990) could lead to further
serious action by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations,
including under Chapter VII,
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Recalling the provisions of Article 103 of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the united Nations,
1. Calls upon all States to carry out their obligations to ensure
strict and complete compliance with resolution 661 (1990) and in
particular paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 thereof;
2. Confirms that resolution 661 (1990) applies to all means of
transport, including aircraft;
3. Decides that all States, notwithstanding the existence of any
rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted
before the date of the present resolution, shall deny permission to
any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would
carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in
humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council
or the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) and in accordance with resolution 666 (1990), or supplies intended strictly for
medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG;
4. Decides further that all States shall deny permission to any
aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of
registration, to overfly its territory unless:
(a) The aircraft lands at an airfield designated by that State
outside Iraq or Kuwait in order to permit its inspection to ensure
that there is no cargo on board in violation of resolution 661 (1990)
or the present resolution, and for this purpose the aircraft may be
detained for as long as necessary; or
(b) The particular flight has been approved by the Committee
established by resolution 661 (1990); or
(c) The flight is certified by the United Nations as solely for
the purposes of UNIIMOG;
5. Decides that each State shall take all necessary measures to
ensure that any aircraft registered in its territory or operated by an
operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in its territory complies with the provisions of resolution 661
(1990) and the present resolution;
6. Decides further that all States shall notify in a timely fashion
the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) of any flight
between its territory and Iraq or Kuwait to which the requirement
to land in paragraph 4 above does not apply, and the purpose for
such a flight;
7. Calls upon all States to cooperate in taking such measures as
may be necessary, consistent with international law, including the
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Chicago Convention, to ensure the effective implementation of the
provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or the present resolution;
8. Calls upon all States to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which
enter their ports and which are being or have been used in violation
of resolution 661 (1990), or to deny such ships entrance to their ports
except in circumstances recognized under international law as necessary to safeguard human life;
9. Reminds all States of their obligations under resolution 661
(1990) with regard to the freezing of Iraqi assets, and the protection
of the assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies,
located within their territory and to report to the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) regarding those assets;
10. Calls upon all States to provide to the Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) information regarding the action taken by
them to implement the provisions laid down in the present resolution;
11. Affirms that the United Nations Organization, the specialized
agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations
system are required to take such measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the terms of resolution 661 (1990) and this resolution;
12. Decides to consider, in the event of evasion of the provisions
of resolution 661 (1990) or of the present resolution by a State or
its nationals or through its territory, measures directed at the State
in question to prevent such evasion;
13. Reaffirms that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq
is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable
under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by
it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave
breaches.
S.C. Res. 670, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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APPENDIX J

RESOLUTION 674
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2951st meeting
on 29 October 1990
The Security Council,
Recalling its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990) 662 (1990), 664
(1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990) and 670 (1990),
Stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for the restoration of
Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and of
the authority of its legitimate Government,
Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying
forces to take third-state nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress
Kuwait and third-state nationals, and the other actions reported to
the Council such as the destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records,
forced departure of Kuwaitis and relocation of population in Kuwait
and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property in Kuwait including hospital supplies and equipment, in violation
of the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations,
the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law,
Expressing grave alarm over the situation of nationals of third
states in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic
and consular missions of such states,
Reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait
and that as a high contracting party to the convention, Iraq is bound
to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under
the convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as
are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches,
Recalling the efforts of the Secretary-General concerning the safety
and well-being of third-state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,
Deeply concerned at the economic cost, and at the loss and suffering
caused to individuals in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion
and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
Reaffirming the goal of the international community of maintaining
international peace and security by seeking to resolve international
disputes and conflicts through peaceful means,
Recalling the important role that the United Nations and its Secretary-General have played in the peaceful solution of disputes and
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conflicts in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations
Charter,
Alarmed by the dangers of the present crisis caused by the Iraqi
invasion and occupation of Kuwait, which directly threaten international peace and security, and seeking to avoid any further worsening of the situation,
Calling upon Iraq to comply with the relevant resolutions of the
Security Council, in particular Resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990) and
664 (1990),
Reaffirming its determination to insure compliance by Iraq with
the Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political and
diplomatic means,
A.
1. Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist from taking third-state nationals hostage,
and mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third-state nationals, and
from any other actions such as those reported to the Council and
described above, violating the decisions of this Council, the Charter
of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna
Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international
law;
2. Invites states to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq as per
paragraph 1 above and to make this information available to the
Council;
3. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfill its obligations to third-state nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, under the Charter, the
Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic
and Consular Relations, general principles of international law and
the relevant resolutions of the Council;
4. Also reaffirms its demand that Iraq permit and facilitate the
immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of those third-state nationals, including diplomatic and consular personnel, who wish to
leave;
5. Demands that Iraq insure the immediate access to food, water
and basic services necessary to the protection and well-being of Kuwaiti nationals and of nationals of third states in Kuwait and Iraq,
including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait;
6. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety
and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in
Kuwait and in Iraq, take no action to hinder these diplomatic and
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consular missions in the performance of their functions, including
access to their nationals and the protection of their person and
interests and rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and
consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of
their personnel;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, in the context of the continued
exercise of his good offices concerning the safety and well-being of
third-state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, to seek to achieve the
objectives of paragraphs 4,5 and 6 and in particular the provision
of food, water and basic services to Kuwaiti nationals and to the
diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the evacuation of
third-state nationals;
8. Reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any
loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states,
and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and
illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
9. Invited states to collect relevant information regarding their
claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution
or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements
as may be established in accordance with international law
10. Requires that Iraq comply with the provisions of the present
resolution and its previous resolutions, failing which the Council will
need to take further measures under the Charter;
11. Decides to remain actively and permanently seized of the
matter until Kuwait has regained its independence and peace has been
restored in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the Security
Council.
B.
12. Reposes its trust in the Secretary-General to make available
his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them
and undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution
to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait
on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990)
and 664 (1990), and calls on all states, both those in the region and
others, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this end, in conformity
with the Charter, in order to improve the situation and restore peace,
security and stability;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results of his good offices and diplomatic efforts.
S.C. Res. 674, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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RESOLUTION 677
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2962nd meeting
on 28 November 1990
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 662 (1990)
of 9 August 1990 and 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990,
Reiterating it concern for the suffering caused to individuals in
Kuwait as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,
Gravely concerned at the ongoing attempt by Iraq to alter the
demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy
the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records
maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait;
2. Mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of
the population register of Kuwait the authenticity of which has been
certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait which covers the
population registration up to 1 August 1990;
3. Request the Secretary-General to establish, in co-operation with
the legitimate Government of Kuwait, an Order of Rules and Regulations governing access and use of the said copy of the population
register.
S.C. Res. 677, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
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APPENDix L

RESOLUTION 678
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting
on 29 November 1990
The Security Council,
Recalling, and reaffirming its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990),
662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990),
670 (1990), 674 (1990) and 677 (1990),
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses
to comply with its obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990) and
the above subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of
the Council,
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international
peace and security,
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and
all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while maintaining all
its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of
goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government
of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements,
as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use
all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the
actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of this resolution;
4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Council regularly
informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
S.C. Res. 678, 45 U.N. SCOR (Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council) at -, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).

